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Abstract
This study explores the impact of different ownership types on the efficiency of the provision of
water utilities. Theories and evidence have shown a puzzling relationship between ownership and
performance. Moreover, relatively recent contributions (Andrews et al., 2011) have argued that this
relationship can be further convoluted by the effect of organisational and environmental variables.
The current study aims to contribute to this literature by providing some empirical evidence for
Italy, by proposing a methodology that combines nonparametric efficiency estimation and cluster
analysis. Our main findings indicate that privately owned utilities indirectly controlled by a public
organisation reach the highest level of efficiency but, when size and geographical location enter the
analysis, ownership has a stronger significant effect on efficiency, and mixed utilities gain higher
cost efficiency. Therefore, we may conclude that administrative reforms about privatisation and the
institutional setting should consider a set of variables that characterise each individual organisation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades waves of administrative reforms have been implemented to improve local
public services performance and cope with increasing constraints on financial resources. In
this scenario, devolution and changes in ownership structure have occurred as a solution to
public sector inefficiencies (Guy et al., 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Savas, 2000; Shaw and
Munday, 1999). Several scholars have investigated whether and how ownership affects perfor-
mance, in order to find the most efficient, effective and fair way to deliver public services. The
persistence of this issue in the literature can be motivated by different theoretical perspectives,
puzzling empirical results and the acknowledgement that the links between ownership and
performance is further complicated by the existence of ‘moderators’ such as organisational and
environmental characteristics of the services provided (Andrews et al., 2011).
The extent of the debate about the ownership of public service production has been exac-
erbated by a wide acceptance of neo-liberal and New Public Management policies (Osborne
and Gaebler, 1992; Hood, 1991) rooted in the Public Choice theory (Niskanen, 1971). Accord-
ing to this perspective, competition represents a solution to overcome public over production
and inefficiency. Therefore it is assumed that governments, at all levels, should privatise and
contract-out services in order to achieve technical and cost efficiency. Ultimately this process
would shift the ownership of service from public to private sector.
Along with Public Choice theory, other theoretical perspectives have dealt with issues re-
garding service delivery choices. First, Williamson (1979, 1999) suggests that transactions cost
and monitoring can play an important role in the choice to externalise services. In particu-
lar, this approach suggests that when transaction costs are low, privatisation can lead to cost
savings. Second, property rights theory (Demsetz, 1967) advocates that private ownership can
lead to better performance, due to better defined property rights and incentives to monitor and
control the managers’ behaviour. Third, the theory of incomplete contracts (Hart and Moore,
1990) suggests that privatisation could reduce costs, but without an adequate incentive sys-
tem, it can also lower services quality. In recent years several studies, such as Bel and Fageda
(2010), Warner and Hefetz (2008), and Bel et al. (2014), among others, have highlighted the
popularity of alternative ownership structures that combine public and private capital—such
as mixed companies and public-private partnerships. Therefore these new types of organiza-
tions can challenge even more the relationship between ownership and performance (Vining
and Weimer, 2015).
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Empirical evidence on the relationship between ownership and performance has been re-
viewed by recent studies, such as Andrews et al. (2011), Bel et al. (2010). Andrews et al.
(2011) review thirty-two studies examine the link between ‘publicness’ and performance in a
wide range of public services. Bel et al. (2010) conduct meta-analysis of twenty-seven stud-
ies comparing the costs of public and private production in solid waste services and water
distribution. Both of these extensive reviews reveal that there is no systematic evidence sup-
porting the superiority of either public or private production for delivering public services.
These studies suggest that performance and efficiency seems to be affected by other factors
apart from ownership, such as transaction costs, economies of scale, regulation, governance, or
the environment. Andrews et al. (2011) refer to these factors as ‘moderators’ of the relationship
between ownership and performance.
In light of the literature, this study investigates whether ownership structure has a signifi-
cant effect on the cost efficiency of water service utilities when ‘moderators’ such as size and
geographical features are simultaneously considered. The empirical evidence is based on a
sample of Italian water utilities from 2008 to 2011.
In this regard, Italy represents an ideal geographical case to study such a problem given
the heterogeneity in the ownership structures, size and environmental features of the water
utilities operating in this country. Moreover attention to Italian water utilities can be further
motivated by three main reasons. First, in recent years the Italian water industry has been at
the centre of a debate about the possibility of liberalisation (Massarutto et al., 2008). Second,
in 2011 the legislator modified the multilevel governance of the industry by abolishing the
so-called “optimal area authority” (“Autorità d’Ambito Ottimale”), more popularly known by
their initials, ATOs, in charge of coordinating the service at territorial level. However the
current regulation has not yet determined which existing or new authorities are to take their
place. Third, it is claimed that the price of water in Italy is one of the cheapest in Europe, but
research results find that this is not sustainable in the long term (Utilitatis, 2011). In this context,
efficiency is a necessary condition to guarantee this vital service in a fair and equal manner. The
same concern is shared with previous studies carried out for other European countries, such as
Spain and Portugal (González-Gómez et al., 2013; Da Cruz et al., 2012). Therefore the current
study attempts to provide empirical results that can help policy makers and local governments
in countries where the implementation of administrative reforms on ownership structure need
to be made in a changing institutional environment and the pressure to fair price of public
service is high.
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The method applied in this paper combines two well-known nonparametric efficiency estimators—
namely, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA, Charnes et al., 1978) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH,
Deprins et al., 1984)—with cluster analysis, following O’Donnell et al. (2008) and Balaguer-
Coll et al. (2013). The advantage of using DEA (and its non-convex variant, FDH) is to rank
water utilities on the basis of their efficiency score without requiring any assumption on the
distribution function of the data (Rao et al., 2005). Moreover, by applying statistical clustering
techniques the study controls for the effect of the ‘moderators’, which has not been carried out
in previous studies.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provide a brief owerview of the studies
regarding the efficiency of water utilities. Section 3 describes the regulatory framework of the
Italian water supply service. Section 4 provides an explanation of the method and data. Section
5 reports the results and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
Since the early 1970s, several studies have assessed the effect of ownership on water service
(WS) efficiency. These studies differ in several respects, including the method used to measure
their efficiency levels. In particular, two groups of studies can be identified: those using ac-
counting methods, and those applying econometrics and operational research methods. The
current study applies an operational research method, namely DEA (and its non-convex vari-
ant, FDH), to estimate WSS utility efficiency. As pointed out by Bogetoft and Otto (2011),
the selection of a benchmarking approach should ‘reflect and respect the characteristics of the
industry’. With particular reference to the WS, Berg and Marques (2011) argue that the lack
of knowledge on the production function in this industry can justify the application of DEA.
This method is considered more flexible than parametric approaches, since it does not require
any assumption on the distribution function of the data. Moreover, Bogetoft (1994) highlighted
the incentive-efficient properties of DEA that can be applied by regulators as it can be seen in
England and Wales (Thanassoulis, 2000a,b).
The first study to apply the concept of Farrell (1957) efficiency—on which DEA is based—in
this particular context was Byrnes et al. (1986), in an analysis focused on the US. The theoretical
perspective on which the study was grounded provided arguments that privately-owned firms
were more efficient than their publicly-owned counterparts. However, the nonparametric tests
reveal no evidence that the latter utilities were ‘more wasteful or operated with more slack
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than privately owned utilities’ (Byrnes et al., 1986, p.341). Following and ‘adjusting’ Byrnes
et al.’s (1986) method, several studies have applied DEA to analyse the relationship between
ownership and water services’ efficiency around the world. In line with the purpose of current
study, the following review briefly outlines the research on the effect of ownership on WS
utility efficiency, classifying the studies into three groups according to their results: (i) studies
that reported no influence of ownership on efficiency; (ii) studies finding that public ownership
improves efficiency; and (iii) those finding better efficiency scores for privately owned utilities.
One of the most relevant contributions among the first group of studies would include
Byrnes et al. (1986). More recent research comprise García-Sánchez (2006), who measures the
technical and scale efficiency of Spanish municipalities, distinguishing between those which
externalised the water services to privately owned utilities and those which provide the service
through public business corporations. The study claims that, in the specific context analysed,
the creation of a quasi-market does not seem to affect efficiency. The author suggests that this
result can be justified by the fact that the creation of public business corporations relieves the
management of the business from the traditional public sector bureaucratic procedures. In
this group of studies we also find Peda et al. (2013) who, in an application to Estonian water
service utilities, found ‘no difference in efficiency between water utilities with different types
of ownership’. Their study also found a positive relationship between population size and
efficiency, corroborating the hypothesis that efficiency gains are attributable to scale economies.
In the second group of studies, one of the most relevant contributions is the one by Romano
and Guerrini (2011) on the efficiency of Italian water utilities. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first study to apply DEA to Italian water utilities, finding that publicly-owned utilities
obtain higher efficiencies than mixed-owned. The authors interpret these results as an indica-
tion that publicly-owned utilities are better able to acquire and use their inputs. Moreover, the
study considers the effect of size and geographical location on the performance of the water
utilities. The results show the existence of economies of scale, since larger companies perform
better. Regarding the geographical location issue, utilities located in Central and Southern
Italy are more efficient than those operating in the north—although the differences were not
statistically significant.
Finally, the third group of studies found superior performance in privately-owned utility
firms. Specifically, Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2009) found that privately-owned utilities are more
efficient than their publicly-owned counterparts. The authors claim that this result is due to
efficiency in the use of labour, pointing out that the influence of trade unions makes it difficult
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to adjust the number of employees.
In sum, the available empirical evidence suggests that the debate on the links between own-
ership and performance is still unsettled. Moreover, the efficiency of water supply services
seems strongly related to their size, as the theoretical approach of economies of scale would
predict. Furthermore the efficiency can be affected by environmental variables, such the hy-
drographical characteristics of the geographical area in which the utilities is located (Martins
et al., 2012). The current research therefore attempts to contribute to this literature by investi-
gating the effect of the three variables considered separately in a first stage, and by combining
their effect in a subsequent stage. This could shed light on the contribution of different owner-
ship structure to control for exogenous conditions, such as hydrographical characteristics and
strategic choices on the size.
3. WATER SERVICE IN ITALY
Water supply services (WSS) are generally considered public services provided through a net-
work, and are regulated by public authorities. Therefore, any speculation on the organisation,
the governance and the performance of these services is strongly affected by the regulatory
framework of each country. The Italian WSS are regulated by four hierarchical levels of juris-
diction: the European Union, the central government, the regional governments, and the local
governments.
European legislation classifies water supply services as a ‘service of general economic in-
terest’ (European Community Treaty, Article 86(2)). Therefore WSS are economic services that
have to be provided to every citizen on a regular basis and at affordable prices, regardless of
the ownership of the service provider. Moreover in 2000 the European Commission issued the
Water Framework Directive (WFD), addressing most of the challenges facing the management
of this crucial resource. Two of the innovations introduced by the WFD were the cost recovery
for water services and the polluter-pays principles. These principles aim to create incentives
for the sustainable and efficient use of water.
As highlighted in the previous section, the last decades have witnessed changes in the own-
ership of public service providers. The European Commission lets each Member State to decide
how it organises the provision of the service of general economic interest, as long as the rules on
both the internal market and competition are observed. As a result, different approaches to the
organisation of WSS can be found among EU Member States. For instance, in The Netherlands
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and Germany, municipal public enterprises provide water services. Conversely, in England and
Wales the service was totally privatised and a regulatory authority established (Bauby, 2012).
In Italy, water supply services were traditionally provided by municipalities. In this context,
the service was financed via public budget, and the tariff was usually insufficient to cover the
costs (Massarutto et al., 2008). In order to improve the efficiency of the industry, the Law 196/94
was enacted in 1994 to reform the industry. First, the reform recognised the network features
of the WSS and introduced the concept of ‘integrated water service’, considering the whole
water supply and sewage system. Second, the reform reorganised the WSS by introducing
territorial authorities, ATOs, with the aim of exploiting economies of scale in the management
of the service. Regions were in charge of identifying these ATOs and municipalities could own
ATOs’ equity shares. About 90 ATOs were identified according to the political-administrative
and hydrographical features of each area (Utilitatis, 2011). The main function assigned to the
ATOs was to draw up a management plan for the WSS and to designate the WSS provider.
In the mid-2000s, Law 196/94 was replaced by the Environmental Code (Decree 152/2006),
which retained the two main innovations of the previous law introduced the European principle
of cost recovery for the WS. Among other norms, article 154 of the Environmental Code stated
that the WSS price had to guarantee remuneration for the capital invested.
Meanwhile, changes had occurred in the institutional organisation of service providers.
Since 1990, a series of reforms, inspired by New Public Management, have been introduced to
promote local public services externalisation. The result is that the WSS provider could be a
municipality, a municipal corporation, a mixed enterprise or a private entity. Moreover some
municipalities have create municipal holdings that invested in private entity providing public
service (Grossi and Mussari, 2009), therefore private entities can have a municipality as indirect
shareholder.
Finally, water supply services were also affected by a series of relatively recent events. First,
the financial crisis of 2010 forced governments to cut their budgets. In this context, the Italian
legislator suggested eliminating the ATOs by the end of 2011. However, this regulation did not
determine which authority should replace the ATOs, a question that still remains unanswered.
Second, in 2011 a referendum repealed article 23-bis of Law 113/2008 and article 154 of the
Environmental Code. Subsequently, the appointment of the WSS is based only on European
legislation, with the result that the service can be provided directly by the municipalities, in
house, by mixed enterprises without any specification of the percentage that must be owned by
private partners, or by privately owned enterprises. A further consequence of the referendum
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was that the tariff should not be set according to the return on the capital invested.
In conclusion, it can be argued that the main consequences of reforms and counter-reforms
of the water supply services are: (i) a multilevel governance structure of the industry, although
the levels of this structure are still uncertain regarding the replacement of the ATOs and the
role of the regions; and (ii) in the absence of an intermediate authority such as the ATOs, it
seems that municipalities could once again be free to choose the delivery mode and appoint the
service provider as they did in the past; (iii) changes in the tariff computation, with particular
regard to the return on the capital invested.
4. METHODS AND DATA
Our study investigates the effect of ownership and the ‘moderators’ size and geographical lo-
cation on the cost efficiency of Italian water utilities. To this end a three-stage methodology
is applied: (i) we measure cost efficiency using two nonparametric estimators, namely, Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and its non-convex variant (Free Disposal Hull, FDH); (ii) cluster
analysis, building groups based on ownership, size and geographical allocation of the organi-
sations; and (iii) testing for differences in the efficiencies in each group and each cluster—i.e.,
nonparametric test is applied to verify whether type of ownership, size, geographical location,
or their combination in clusters result in significant efficiency differences.
This methodological approach is similar to the one considered by Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013)
in studying the efficiency of Spanish municipalities. However it differs from previous relevant
work on water utilities, such as (Peda et al., 2013; Romano and Guerrini, 2011), who considered
an a priori classification of organizations, without considering the combined effect of different
classification on performance. Therefore, the procedure carried out in this study allows to de-
fine the clusters ex post instead of ex ante identifying a combination of factors that can influence
cost efficiency and controlling for heterogeneity.
An explanation of the models applied to estimate the cost efficiency and the non-parametric
test used are provided in the following two subsections, respectively. Then a description of the
sample and the data used is provided.
4.1. Data Envelopment Analysis and Free Disposal Hull
The origin of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) dates back to Farrell’s (1957) approach to
frontier estimation, although it was not until 1978 that the term was first used (Charnes et al.,
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1978). Since then, this method has become one of the most popular techniques for benchmark-
ing, with applications from financial firms to public service utilities—including water utilities
(Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010).
DEA is a mathematical programming technique for the estimation of the best production
frontier (or envelopment) and the measurement of the relative efficiency of different organisa-
tions (Bogetoft and Otto, 2011). This approach assigns a score between 0 and 1 to each decision
making unit (in the case that an input orientation and Farrell distance functions are consid-
ered), allowing the organisations to be ranked on the basis of an increasing efficiency order.
The term ‘frontier’ identifies the most efficient organisation that satisfies either the input or
output-based Farrell efficiency condition.
In this study, efficiency measures are computed on the basis of two assumptions. Firstly
efficiency score are input-based and thus measure the level of input to obtain a given amount of
output 1. Secondly inputs are expressed in monetary terms allowing to measure cost efficiency.
Formally, the input-oriented DEA is based on the solution of the following linear program-
ming problem (Rao et al., 2005; Coelli and Walding, 2006):
minθ,λ θ
s.t.
yi + Yλ ≥ 0,
θxi − Xλ ≥ 0,
N1′λ = 1,
λ ≥ 0.
(1)
where:
• yi is an M× 1 vector of outputs produced by the i
th firm,
• Y is the M× N matrix of outputs of the N firms in the sample,
• X is the K × N matrix of inputs of the N firms,
• λ is an N × 1 vector of weights (which relate to the peer firms) and θ is a scalar measure
of efficiency, which takes a value between 0 and 1 (inclusive).
1As indicated by Rao et al. (2005), the input-oriented efficiency addresses the question: ‘By how much can input
quantities be proportionally reduced without changing the output quantities produced?’ (Rao et al., 2005, p.137).
This approach seems particularly suitable for the context of water industry, where utilities are more more able to
control their inputs rather than their outputs—such as water delivery and population served (Abbott and Cohen,
2009; Coelli and Walding, 2006; Romano and Guerrini, 2011).
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When considering FDH (Deprins et al., 1984) instead of DEA, the last assumption is dropped
and it is therefore a more general version of the DEA estimator, since it is not restricted to con-
vex technologies. This, in practical terms, implies that each utility is compared only to other
existing ones, and that it cannot be evaluated against any convex combinations of efficient util-
ities. As a result, the FDH frontier can be considered even more flexible than DEA, since the
required assumptions are fewer.
The FDH estimator might be a reasonable choice in those cases where it is difficult to find
a theoretical (or empirical) justification for postulating convexity. Indivisibilities of inputs and
outputs might exist as well as economies of scale and specialisation, which thwart the convexity
assumption. In addition to this, if the true production set is convex, then the DEA and FDH
are both consistent estimators; in contrast, if the true production set is not convex, FDH is a
consistent estimator of the production set, whereas DEA is not. Some of the characteristics of
FDH have recently been reviewed by Diewert and Fox (2014).
4.2. Testing for the equality of distributions of efficiency scores
A variety of instruments can considered to test whether the differences between some of the
moments that characterise two given distributions differ statistically. Some of these instruments
are tests, such as the Wilcoxon test, which have the advantage of being relatively robust to the
violation of the normality assumption, but have the limitation of restraining the analysis to one
moment of the distribution only (in our case, the distribution of efficiency scores), namely the
median. However, some recent applications (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2010) have considered some
tools developed in the field of nonparametric statistics such as the Li (1996) test, which tests
whether two distributions, and not just two summary statistics such as the mean or the median,
differ statistically.
To apply this test, the univariate density functions of the indicators of interest—in our
case efficiency scores—must be first estimated nonparametrically considering kernel smoothing
methods (Li and Racine, 2007). Specifically, the kernel estimator fˆ of a univariate density
function f based on a sample of N efficiency scores, corresponding to the N firms, can be
expressed as:
fˆ (z) =
1
Nh
N
∑
i=1
K
(z− θˆi
h
)
(2)
where i is the utility firm index, θˆi is the efficiency score of the firm under analysis, z the
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evaluation point, h is the smoothing parameter,2 and K is a Gaussian kernel satisfying certain
properties (Li and Racine, 2007).
The Li (1996) test is based on measuring the distance between two density functions, f (x)
y g(x), via the mean integrated square error (MISE):
I = I
(
f (z), g(z)
)
=
∫
z
(
f (z)− g(z)
)2
dz =
∫
z
(
f 2(z) + g2(z)− 2 f (z)g(z)
)
dz
=
∫
z
(
f (z)dF(z) + g(z)dG(z) − 2g(z)dF(z)
)
(3)
where F and G are two candidates for the distribution of Z, with density functions f (z) and
g(z), which are estimated by considering the kernel smoothing methods referred to above.
Therefore, fˆ is the nonparametric kernel smoothing estimator for f , and gˆ the nonparametric
kernel smoothing estimator for g, whose expression is analogous to (2):
gˆ(z) =
1
Nh
N
∑
i=1
K
(z− δˆi
h
)
(4)
where δˆi would be the efficiencies corresponding to another distribution—in sum, to another
group of firms.
Given expressions (2) and (4), a possible estimator for I is:
I˜ =
∫
x
(
fˆ (z)− gˆ(z)
)2
dx
=
1
N2h
N
∑
j=1
N
∑
i=1
[
K
( θˆj − θˆi
h
)
+ K
( δˆj − δˆi
h
)
− 2K
( δˆj − θˆi
h
)
− K
( θˆj − δˆj
h
)]
+
1
N2h
N
∑
i=1
[
2K(0)− 2K
( θˆj − δˆi
h
)]
(5)
The statistic on which the test is based, which could be constructed from the MISE, is
therefore (see Fan, 1994; Li, 1996; Pagan and Ullah, 1999):
T =
Nh1/2 I˜
σˆ
(6)
where
σˆ =
1
N2h
N
∑
j=1
N
∑
i=1
[
K
( θˆj − θˆi
h
)
+ K
( δˆj − δˆi
h
)
+ 2K
( θˆj − δˆi
h
)]
(7)
2We chose the plug-in methods proposed by Sheather and Jones (1991) because of their reasonable balance
between bias and variance.
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4.3. The sample
As stated above, the empirical evidence presented in this paper focuses on a sample of water
utilities operating in Italy from 2008 to 2011. A complete list of Italian water utilities is obtained
from Federutilities, an Italian association of public services provider.3 However, the sample is
restricted to mono-service utilities with available data and stable ownership structure. There-
fore, only utilities for which the percentage of ownership has not changed from 2008 to 2011
are included in the analysis. The final sample is comprised of 68 utilities in each of four years
analysed, leading to 272 observations across the four years (Table 1). The 68 utilities represent
70% of the ones listed by Federutilities and they served about 45% of the Italian population
2011. Furthermore utilities are classified according to three variables: ownership structure, size
and geographical location.
As highlighted in the previous section, a water supply services’ provider could be a munic-
ipality, a municipal corporation, a municipal holding, a mixed enterprise or a private entity. In
this scenario, our study focuses on water services which are externalised by the local govern-
ment through a separate entity, namely an utility, with a different type of ownership structure.
In our particular sample, five types of ownership are identified (Table 1). Therefore, as demon-
strated above, the conventional classification of private, public and mixed ownership used by
previous research (Guerrini et al., 2011) does not seem to fully reflect the complexity of the
Italian context or any other national setting where many alternative modes to delivery public
services coexist (Tavares and Camöes, 2007; Bel and Fageda, 2010). Along with publicly owned
(type 1) and privately owned (type 2) utilities, this research distinguishes mixed utilities in two
groups: in one group, utilities in which the controlling shareholder is a public organisation
(type 3) and, in the other, utilities in which the controlling shareholder is a private organization
(type 4). Finally, we define a separate category of private utilities in which the indirect main
shareholder is a public are identified (type 5). As reported in 1 32 utilities (128 observation over
four years), corresponding to 47% of the sample, are publicly owned. The remaining utilities
are mainly spread in type 2 and type 3. Only three and six utilities are classified as type 4 and
type 5, respectively.
The size of water utilities is usually measured considering the population served. However,
due to a lack of data over the time span analysed, a proxy is used. A possible proxy is total
revenue, obtained from the financial statements. This variable shows to be strongly linear
correlated with the population served (92%), suggesting revenue can be used as proxy of the
3In 2015 Federutilities was merged in Utilitalia.
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population served with confidence. Table 1 shows that the sample is mainly characterised in
small and medium size utilities, only three are considered to be large.
Finally, the third variable considered is geographical location. Most of the utilities in the
sample are situated in the Northern of Italy, while 15% and 19% are in the Centre and Southern
regions, respectively (Table 1). Italy is characterised by heterogeneous hydrographical features
that can affect efficiency levels. Northern and Southern regions, except for few exceptions, are
characterized by surface waters that required more sophisticated purification process leading
to high operational and capital costs (Istat, 2008, 2014).
Utilities are further classified using cluster analysis, with the attempt to maximise the ho-
mogeneity of units within the clusters while maximising the heterogeneity among clusters. In
the current analysis, five clusters are identified, whose characteristics are reported in Table 2.
All the variables are significant with regard to the clusters, except for the fourth type of own-
ership (mixed owned utilities with a private organisation that owns 50% or more). The cluster
analysis discriminates between medium size publicly owned utilities in central and Southern
Italy (Cluster 1) and those that are located in the north of the country (Cluster 3). Cluster 2
contains both mixed and privately owned utilities but in both cases the main direct or indirect
shareholder is a public organisation and do not discriminate between size and geographical
location. Cluster 4 is characterised by mainly small sized privately owned utilities located in
Southern Italy. Finally, Cluster 5 aggregates mainly small sized publicly owned and mixed
owned utilities in Northern Italy.
4.4. Inputs and outputs
One of the biggest challenges in the application of DEA and FDH is the selection of the input-
output variables suitable and available for water utilities. Consistently with the aim to estimate
cost efficiency scores, operational costs are used. In details, four operational costs are consid-
ered as input, namely, cost of materials, cost of services, cost of using third party resources
(such as rented plant and equipment), and wages.
The most popular measures of outputs are the amount of water delivered, the population
served and the length of water mains (Coelli and Walding, 2006). However, the above data are
not accessible for all the utilities in the sample and the population served is available only for
2011. Therefore, as for the variable size, revenue is used as a proxy.
Finally, since the analysis is longitudinal and both inputs and outputs are expressed in
monetary terms, the data are deflated by the Italian consumer price index in order to correct
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them for the inflation (Coelli and Walding, 2006). This adjustment is particular relevant, since
the time frame analysed is characterised by a considerable increase in prices (5.5%).
5. RESULTS
5.1. DEA and FDH efficiencies
Efficiency scores for the utilities in the sample over the 4 years computed via DEA and FDH
are reported in Tables 5–8. The first two tables (5 and 6) report DEA efficiencies, considering
the three classification criteria both separately (Table 5) and jointly (Table 6). Tables 7 and 8
report analogous information for FDH.
The efficiencies are higher for FDH (76.74% vs. 63.57%). This result was to be expected,
given the intrinsic differences between DEA and FDH—i.e. under FDH firms are efficient by
default and, therefore, the number of efficient utilities is also much higher (66.18% vs. 26.68%).
Taking into account the relatively low number of inefficient units yielded by FDH and how
close the means corresponding to both estimators are, it implies that, under FDH, the inefficient
utilities perform quite poorly.
When considering the ex ante classifications (ownership, size, geographical location), re-
markable differences are perceived among groups within each of the hypotheses considered.
In the case of the groups constructed according to their ownership type, the discrepancies
are particularly large. In the case of the DEA efficiency scores (Table 5), the discrepancies
among average efficiencies are quite large, ranging from 49.19% for the most inefficient group
(privately-owned utilities) to 90.42% for the least inefficient (privately-owned utilities with a
public organisation as the main indirect shareholder). Focusing on the median, in order to
isolate the effects of potential outliers, these discrepancies are even higher—the medians are
48.99% and 97.78% for these two groups, respectively. Results are robust to the efficiency esti-
mator considered, since FDH efficiencies (Table 7) also reveal remarkable discrepancies among
some of the groups’ measures of centrality. However, in this case, given the high number of
efficient firms (the median is 1 for four of the five categories), the discrepancies among other
groups are very low.
When the ‘moderators’, i.e., size and geographical location, are considered separately re-
sults vary depending on the hypothesis considered. Regarding size, large firms are particularly
efficient—58.33% of them are efficient, even under the more demanding DEA (see Table 5). In
contrast, small firms are quite inefficient, since only 17.97% of the firms are efficient, and the
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median is also quite low (29.30%). This finding is consistent with previous research that indi-
cated the existence of economies of scale in the water industry (Romano and Guerrini, 2011;
Peda et al., 2013). Results are also robust under FDH, although with a remarkably higher num-
ber of efficient firms (46.09%, 83.33% and 91.67% for small, medium and large firms, compared
to 17.97%, 36.36% and 58.33% under DEA).
These discrepancies are more modest when analysing results for groups based on their
geographical location. The discrepancies among groups’ average efficiencies are much lower
for both DEA (Table 5) and FDH (Table 7). However, for both estimators the utility firms in the
centre of Italy are the least inefficient, as also highlighted by previous research (Romano and
Guerrini, 2011).
5.2. The ‘moderators’
As indicated in the introduction, understanding the link between ownership and performance
might be particularly intricate due to the effects of ‘moderators’, among which Andrews et al.
(2011) highlight the role of size, geographical location, and governance. The current paper has
combined these factors in clusters analysis in order to take into account their effect on efficiency.
The summary statistics for the efficiencies corresponding to the five groups yielded by the
cluster analysis are reported in Tables 6 and 8 for DEA and FDH, respectively. The differences
are high, especially when comparing groups 2 (mixed ownership with both direct and indirect
main public organisation as shareholder) and 3 (publicly owned, medium, in Northern Italy),
which are the least inefficient, with clusters 4 (privately owned, small, in Southern Italy) and
5 (publicly owned, small, in Southern Italy), and this result is very robust to the convexity
assumption.
Specifically, in the case of DEA (Table 6), the average efficiencies corresponding to groups 2
and 3 are particularly high (81.29% and 86.26%, respectively), analogously to the values for the
medians (93.99% and 97.16%, respectively). In contrast, the behaviour is quite the opposite for
clusters 4 and 5, whose medians are 52.78% and 24.93%, suggesting that the mix of privately
owned and small firms in Southern Italy may be particularly problematic in terms of efficiency.
This result holds when the convexity assumption is relaxed, as shown in Table 8. Therefore,
this finding seems to emphasise the relevance of economies of scale and the importance of
public investment in the water industry especially in areas where purification process need to
be more intense, such as in the south part of the country.
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5.3. Testing for the differences among IWSS efficiency scores
The analysis in the above paragraphs is based on summary statistics only and, therefore, its
statistical precision is limited. In this section the methods proposed in section 4.2 are applied
to test whether the differences among the efficiencies of firms in the groups formed according
to different criteria are significant or not. The method employed, as indicated in section 4.2, has
the interesting virtue that it does not compare summary statistics but entire distributions of ef-
ficiency, as well as being fully nonparametric (and, therefore, consistent with the nonparametric
DEA and FDH estimators).
This test compares the densities, estimated via kernel smoothing, for the unconditioned
and conditioned relative series of efficiencies, where the unconditioned relative efficiency se-
ries corresponds to each firm’s efficiency, divided by the average corresponding to all firms
(computed yearly), and the conditioned relative efficiency series corresponds to each firm’s
efficiency divided by its group average; this average will differ depending on the hypothesis
considered—ownership, size, geographical location or their combined effect.
The densities are displayed in Figures 1 and 2 for DEA and FDH efficiency scores, respec-
tively. The lines in each sub-figure correspond to the unconditioned (solid line) and conditioned
(dashed lines) relative efficiency series. Regardless of the convexity assumption, and even the
unconditioned or conditioned series, the amount of multi-modality is remarkable, with pro-
nounced modes well below the mean (which is 1, given we are dividing by the mean). This
suggests there are non-negligible pockets of inefficient behaviour which do not vanish after
controlling for our three factors—or their combined effects.
If the conditioning results in tighter densities and closer to the mean (i.e., unity), it would
indicate that the conditioning scheme considered is relevant—i.e., efficiencies for all utility
firms in the same group would be similar. However, this is only the case when conditioning
for size and, to a lesser extent, ownership, whereas the effect of geography is negligible (den-
sities almost overlap). The combined effect (the ‘moderators’) shows the strongest effect, as
densities shift leftwards, approaching the mean (see Figures 1.d and 2.d), and corroborating
the descriptive analysis carried out in the previous section.
Li’s (1996) test provides statistical evidence to support this visual analysis. Results, shown
in Table 9 for both DEA and FDH corroborate the analysis stemming from the visual inspection
of the densities, since differences are particularly significant when considering the combined
effect of the three hypotheses, or size alone. In contrast, in the case of geographical location the
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differences are not significant, whereas in the case of the type of ownership the effect is only
significant at the 5% significance level.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study has been to analyse the influence of local public ownership on
the efficiency of Italian water utilities. The study was motivated by the puzzling relationship
between the different types of ownership and efficiency. In addition, the literature has identified
a gap in understanding the effect of ‘moderators’ on the performance of water supply services.
This paper focused on a relevant public service, namely, water supply services.
We have considered the case of Italy, where these services have traditionally been provided
by local governments, but changes in regulation and the acceptance of paradigms such as New
Public Management have resulted in such services being provided by different organisations.
The current study has gone beyond the conventional classification in three ownership types
(public, private and mixed), identifying five types and reflecting better the complexity of pub-
lic service organisation in Italy and in other countries. In this context, the relationship between
types of ownership and efficiency is further involved due to the disparate sizes and geographi-
cal locations of the utilities. Although previous studies considered the effect of ownership type,
geographical location and size separately, this study explored the effect of these three factors
on efficiency simultaneously.
From a methodological point of view, it can be argued that cluster analysis and appropriate
nonparametric tests help to better discriminate among the different factors that can affect the
efficiency of water utilities. Specifically, we measure efficiency by applying both Data Envel-
opment Analysis and Free Disposal Hull, and tests based on kernel smoothing to ascertain
whether the differences between the different clusters were significant or not. Using these
methods the current study has found statistically significant differences in efficiencies across
ownership types, and even stronger results when considering groups based on size or the
groups yielded by cluster analysis—which combine all the three factors, namely, ownership
type, size and geographical characteristics.
Furthermore from the results, it can be argued that privately owned utilities indirectly con-
trolled by public organisation reach the highest level of efficiency when size and geographical
location are not considered. However the combined effect of ownership, size and geographical
location has a stronger effect on efficiency. In this case, mixed-owned water utilities, in which
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a public organisation has direct or indirect control, are those with higher efficiency levels.
Our results might therefore be suggesting that policy makers and regulators should care-
fully consider the intrinsic characteristics of each industry in order to achieve better perfor-
mance for public services. In particular, in the water industry, both public-private partnerships
as well as the role of economies of scale seem to be important aspects to take into consideration,
particularly when evaluating them simultaneously.
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Table 1: Italian water service utilities, distribution according to ownership, size and geographical location
Ownership # # %
Publicly owned utilities (ownership type 1) 32 128 47%
Privately owned utilities (ownership type 2) 15 60 22%
Mixed owned utilities with public organisation that owns 50% or more (ownership type 3) 12 48 18%
Mixed owned utilities with private organisation that owns 50% or more (ownership type 4) 3 12 4%
Privately owned utilities with main a public organisation as indirect shareholder (ownership type 5) 6 24 9%
Total 68 272 100%
Size # # %
Small 32 128 47.1%
Medium 33 132 48.5%
Large 3 12 4.4%
Total 68 272 100%
Geographical Location # # %
North 39 156 57.4%
Centre 10 40 14.7%
South 19 76 27.9%
Total 68 272 100%
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Table 2: Italian water service utilities, characteristics of the clusters based on ownership, size and geographical locationa
Variables Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
Cluster label
Public owned,
medium-large, in
Center-Southern
Italy
Mixed ownership
with public organ-
isations as main
shareholders and
privately owned
with a public or-
ganisation as main
indirect shareholder
Publicly owned,
medium, in North-
ern Italy
Privately owned,
small, in Southern
Italy
Public owned and
mixed owned utili-
ties, small, in North-
ern Italy
# % # % # % # % # %
Ownership
Publicly owned utili-
ties
13 100% 0 0% 11 100% 0 0% 8 44%
Privately owned util-
ities
0 0% 2 13% 0 0% 10 91% 3 17%
Mixed owned utili-
ties with public or-
ganisation that owns
50% or more
0 0% 6 40% 0 0% 1 9% 5 28%
Mixed owned utili-
ties with private or-
ganisation that owns
50% or more
0 0% 2 13% 0 0% 0 0% 1 6%
Privately owned util-
ities with public or-
ganisation as main
indirect shareholders
0 0% 5 33% 0 0% 0 0% 1 6%
Size
Small 3 23% 0 0% 0 0% 11 100% 18 100%
Medium 7 54% 15 100% 11 100% 0 0% 0 0%
Large 3 23% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Geographical location
Northern Italy 1 8% 9 60% 11 100% 0 0% 18 100%
Central Italy 5 38% 5 33% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Southern Italy 7 54% 1 7% 0 0% 11 100% 0 0%
# of utilities in the cluster 13 100% 15 100% 11 100% 11 100% 18 100%
a We conducted a χ2-test in order to assign the variables to the clusters. For all the variables the test was significant (5%), except for the type of ownership #4
(mixed owned utilities with private organisation that owns 50% or more).
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Table 3: Description of the clusters
Cluster Description
# of firms in the
cluster
% of the total
number of firms
Cluster 1 Publicly owned, medium-large, in Central-Southern Italy 13 19%
Cluster 2 Mixed owned with both direct and indirect main public organisation as shareholder 15 22%
Cluster 3 Publicly owned, medium, in Northern Italy 11 16%
Cluster 4 Privately owned, small, in Southern Italy 11 16%
Cluster 5 Publicly owned and mixed owned utilities, small, in Northern Italy 18 26%
Total 68 100%
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Table 4: Definition of inputs and outputs
Variable Variable name Description
Output
y1 Total revenue Accrued revenue recorded in the income statement
Inputs
x1 Cost of materials Accrued cost of raw material recorded in the income statement
x2 Cost of labour Accrued cost of labor recorded in the income statement
x3 Cost of services Accrued cost of services recorded in the income statement
x4 Cost of leases Accrued cost of rented asset and in operating leasing recorded in the income statement
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Table 5: DEA efficiency scores for Italian water service utilities, distribution according to own-
ership, size and geographical location
Classification Group Mean 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Std.dev. % efficient firms
Ownership
Type 1 0.6567 0.3149 0.7587 1.0000 0.3404 26.56
Type 2 0.4919 0.1532 0.4899 0.8770 0.3634 21.67
Type 3 0.6397 0.2076 0.7183 1.0000 0.3781 39.58
Type 4 0.5774 0.2890 0.5375 0.8670 0.3033 16.67
Type 5 0.9042 0.8035 0.9778 1.0000 0.1224 41.67
Size
Small 0.4572 0.1416 0.2930 0.7944 0.3584 17.97
Medium 0.7818 0.6717 0.8737 1.0000 0.2656 36.36
Large 0.9311 0.8871 1.0000 1.0000 0.1196 58.33
Geography
North 0.6371 0.2451 0.7382 1.0000 0.3483 28.21
Centre 0.7115 0.4676 0.9037 1.0000 0.3651 35.00
South 0.5929 0.2073 0.6001 1.0000 0.3518 26.32
Total 0.6357 0.2451 0.7478 1.0000 0.3524 28.68
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Table 6: DEA efficiency scores for Italian water service utilities, distribution according to clus-
ters
Classification Group Mean 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Std.dev. % efficient firms
Clusters
Cluster 1 0.6366 0.3786 0.7589 0.9142 0.3407 19.23
Cluster 2 0.8129 0.7198 0.9399 1.0000 0.2555 41.67
Cluster 3 0.8626 0.7514 0.9716 1.0000 0.1862 47.73
Cluster 4 0.5161 0.1532 0.5278 0.9687 0.3729 25.00
Cluster 5 0.4216 0.1423 0.2493 0.6648 0.3425 15.28
Total 0.6357 0.2451 0.7478 1.0000 0.3524 28.68
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Table 7: FDH efficiency scores for Italian water service utilities, distribution according to own-
ership, size and geographical location
Classification Group Mean 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Std.dev. % efficient firms
Ownership
Type 1 0.7989 0.7392 1.0000 1.0000 0.3457 68.75
Type 2 0.6159 0.2189 0.6494 1.0000 0.3914 46.67
Type 3 0.7492 0.2468 1.0000 1.0000 0.3991 66.67
Type 4 0.7959 0.6439 1.0000 1.0000 0.3281 66.67
Type 5 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 100.00
Size
Small 0.6008 0.1943 0.6869 1.0000 0.4051 46.09
Medium 0.9095 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.2479 83.33
Large 0.9822 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0617 91.67
Geography
North 0.7750 0.4696 1.0000 1.0000 0.3563 65.38
Centre 0.8237 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3585 80.00
South 0.7221 0.2630 1.0000 1.0000 0.3782 60.53
Total 0.7674 0.4276 1.0000 1.0000 0.3630 66.18
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Table 8: FDH efficiency scores for Italian water service utilities, distribution according to clus-
ters
Classification Group Mean 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Std.dev. % efficient firms
Clusters
Cluster 1 0.7752 0.5834 1.0000 1.0000 0.3685 67.31
Cluster 2 0.9454 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.2058 90.00
Cluster 3 0.9610 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.1418 86.36
Cluster 4 0.6254 0.2176 1.0000 1.0000 0.4070 52.27
Cluster 5 0.5819 0.1943 0.6086 1.0000 0.4003 41.67
Total 0.7674 0.4276 1.0000 1.0000 0.3630 66.18
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Table 9: Testing the closeness between unconditioned and conditioned relative efficiency series
(Li, 1996)
DEA
Null hypothesis T-statistic p-value
H0 : f (Unconditioned) = g(Ownership-conditioned) 2.1631 0.0153
H0 : f (Unconditioned) = g(Size-conditioned) 26.1374 0.0000
H0 : f (Unconditioned) = g(Geographical location-conditioned) –1.0027 0.8420
H0 : f (Unconditioned) = g(Combined effect) 22.5473 0.0000
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Figure 1: Kernel density plots of the unconditioned vs. conditioned efficiencies, DEA
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Notes: All figures contain densities estimated using kernel smoothing for unconditioned and conditioned
DEA efficiency scores. The vertical lines in each plot represent the average for all series, since we divide by the
corresponding (group) mean. A Gaussian kernel and the Sheather and Jones (1991) plug-in bandwidth were
chosen.
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Figure 2: Kernel density plots of the unconditioned vs. conditioned efficiencies, FDH
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Notes: All figures contain densities estimated using kernel smoothing for unconditioned and conditioned
FDH efficiency scores. The vertical lines in each plot represent the average for all series, since we divide by the
corresponding (group) mean. A Gaussian kernel and the Sheather and Jones (1991) plug-in bandwidth were
chosen.
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